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In her reaction, Hendrika Vande Kemp ( 1987) joins other critics of psychology in arguing 
for a new psychology. The authors believe, however, that psychology developed as a science 
because it was productive and that more subjective methods will gain respectability only 
through similar productivity. In her critique, Vande Kemp creates a circular argument by 
suggesting that the authors' position Jacks a proper historicaVphilosophical perspective, and 
she underestimates the sophistication of those with whom she disagrees. Finally, the authors 
disagree that there is no point in arguing with the most conservative anti-psychologists, since 
they may be having a disproportionate influence on public perceptions of psychology. 
Hendrika Vande Kemp's ( 1987) response 
to our article on Christian anti-psychology is 
reminiscent of Christ's parable of the wheat 
and the tares (Matthew 13:24-30). Failing to 
consider the consequences of their actions, the 
servants in haste would have destroyed the 
entire wheat harvest in order to eliminate the 
tares. Vande Kemp's desire to weed psychol-
ogy of its scientific roots places her in the 
camp of those who would remake psychology 
in their own image and rob psychology of a 
methodology which has provided a rich 
harvest for the last century. In Vande Kemp's 
case, it is an image of psychology reunited 
with philosophy. Vande Kemp writes that 
"contemporary psychologists would generate 
much more meaningful research if they were 
not afraid to align themselves with 'the old 
psychology' which was undifferentiated from 
philosophy" (p. xx). This is reminiscent of the 
arguments of Van Leeuwen (1982), who 
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would reshape psychology by humanizing it. 
She too believes that a born-again psychology 
would be more productive. But in what way 
was the old philosophical psychology more 
productive? Many of the concerns we ex-
pressed about a humanized psychology (i.e., 
uncontrolled error and deception) might also 
apply to a philosophized psychology. Ulti-
mately, any suggested improvement in psy-
chology must be judged by its productivity in 
terms of theory or research. In this respect, the 
humanizers of science, like Van Leeuwen and 
Farnsworth (1985), would seem to have a 
stronger position than Vande Kemp in that 
they can point to research produced through 
phenomenological methods. 
Vande Kemp misreads our argument 
when she concludes that we assume only one 
path to knowledge is applicable to science. 
Our epistemology would appear less "simplis-
tic" if she would note that our position is that 
"psychology ... emphasizes [italics added] 
observation, measurement, and experimenta-
tion" and that "logic and reason" are a 
valuable part of the process (Foster & 
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Ledbetter, 1987, p. 11 ). We further conceded 
that "the picture of psychology as a completely 
objective, carefully reasoned, experimental 
science has been successfully questioned ... " 
(p. 14). Regardless of Vande Kemps's con-
tention that all sources of knowledge apply to 
science, our point here is that the emphasis on 
requirements of observation and experimen-
tation have been successful in creating a 
productive discipline. Other disciplines find 
different emphases productive and we have no 
more desire to reshape those disciplines than 
we have to reshape ours. 
Vande Kemp ( 1987) spends part of her 
paper expressing discontent with our use of 
certain terms. For example, she described our 
defmition of empiricism as" extremely narrow" 
(p. 21), and suggested we erroneously defined 
common sense as a source of knowledge and 
that we carelessly used the concept of intuition 
(p. 21). We could argue that our definition of 
empiricism was specific and not narrow, that 
Kilpatrick (1983) does argue for common 
sense as a source of knowledge, and that if we 
had used the concept of intuition in a more 
limited fashion then we would have been 
subject to the criticism Van de Kemp leveled at 
our use of the term "empiricism." But instead 
it might be more instructive to note that 
conflicts such as these over semantic hygiene 
often make up responses and responses to 
responses. These are often reminiscent of a 
controversy between Edward Titchener and 
James Mark Baldwin in the early days of 
psychology (Hothersall, 1984). Wundt had 
reported a consistent difference in reaction 
times between motor and sensory responses to 
a stimulus. Based on his research Baldwin 
concluded that no such difference exists and 
that indeed if such a difference existed it was in 
the opposite direction. Titchener accepted 
Wundt's finding and accused Baldwin of 
sloppy methodology. In response, Baldwin 
(1895) wrote: 
The attempt to rule these results out on the ground of 
incompetency in the reagents(subjects) is in my opinion a 
flagrant argumentum in circulo. Their contention is that a 
certain Anlage or aptitude is necessary in or to experi-
mentation on reaction times. And when we ask what the 
Anlage is, we are told that the only indication of it is the 
ability of the reagent to turn out reactions which give the 
distinction between motor and ·sensory time, which 
Wundt and his followers consider the proper one. In other 
words, only certain cases prove their result, and these 
cases are selected because they prove that result 
(Baldwin, p. 265) 
At times it appears that Vande Kemp is 
arguing that not ·accepting her historicaV 
philosophical perspective on terms and 
concepts leads to faulty thinking regarding 
psychology, thus creating a similar argumen-
tum in circulo. And if we find ourselves in 
disagreement with Vande Kemp we supposedly 
have inadequate understanding. How will we 
know when our thinking and understanding 
become correct? When we accept her his-
toricaVphilosophical perspective on the dis-
puted terms and concepts! 
Even if those who differ in view from 
Vande Kemp (1987) would overcome their 
"naivete concerning matters philosophical" 
(p. 19) it would seem unlikely that all conflicts 
would magically disappear. Vande Kemp 
appears to underestimate the sophistication of 
those who oppose her views. This can be seen 
in her implied hierarchy of intellectual 
sophistication. Conservative anti-psychologists 
are classed as the least sophisticated observers, 
humanizers such as Van Leeuwen ( 1982) and 
Evans ( 1982) as "more sophisticated observers" 
(p. 25), and those who think as she does are 
the most sophisticated. Surely there are 
sophisticated observers representing a variety 
of positions on the issues involved. 
Our approach to understanding the conflict 
between psychology and anti-psychologists 
~as to loo~ at different ways of knowing 
mstead of d1fferent levels of sophistication. In 
so doing we tried to avoid the danger of failing 
to respect the competence of those advocating 
alternative positions (admittedly this is not 
easy to do). For example, in his book The 
Battle for the Mind, Tim LaHaye (1980) 
makes such an error when he identifies the 
hum.~ist obsessions to be sex, pornography, 
m.anJuana, drugs, self-indulgence, rights 
w1thout responsibilities, and disillusionment 
with America (p. 136). We suspect that 
LaHaye would be hard pressed to fmd 
humanists who would agree with this charac-
terization. We also doubt whether Van 
Leeuwen ( 1982), Evans ( 1982), or the 
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conservative anti-psychologists consider them-
selves less sophisticated observers than Vande 
Kemp. 
Van de Kemp is correct when she assumes 
we believe modern science is superior to its 
historical predecessors if by this she means it 
gives insights in a way that foiT?er ~~proaches 
could not While we agree that mtuttion has an 
important role in science, we believe remakers 
of psychology, such as Vande Kemp and Van 
Leeuwen (1982), open the door to subjective 
sources of data uncomfortably wide. At best it 
would become more difficult to establish a 
verifiable reality and at worst it becomes 
untenable to exclude hallucinations, delusions, 
and other subjective phenomenon as data. 
Vande Kemp's (1987) and O'Donnell's 
(1979) suggestion that Boring (1950) ~ight 
have used his history of psychology text m an 
attempt to shape its destiny and cut it off from 
its historical roots is not persuasive for two 
reasons. First, it is no more reasonable to 
assume that Boring's history text shaped the 
thinking of psychologists than it is to assume 
that the text was used because it reflected the 
thinking of those teaching the history of 
psychology. Second, the argument that Boring 
distorted his history to favor experimental 
psychology in an attempt to persuade is not 
particularly compelling since he clearly states 
his intentions and narrowed perspective. For 
example, Vande Kemp writes "Boring's 
philosophy of positivism and bias for experi-
mentation [italics added) were apparent in his 
assessment of our history" (p. 22). This 
shouldn't be too surprising in a book titled A 
History of Experimental Psychology. In his 
preface to the first edition of his book Boring 
( 1950) further clarifies the limits of his 
history. 
Naturally the words "experimental psychology" must 
mean, in my title, what they meant to Wundt and what 
they meant to nearly all psychologists for fifty or sixty 
years-that is to say, the psychology of the generalized, 
human, normal, adult mind as revealed in the psycho-
logical laboratory. In making this choice I have had no 
doctrinaire's thesis to defend. Animal psychology is of the 
laboratory; the mental tests are in a way experimental; 
abnormal psychology may be experimental. The first two 
of these subjects I have brought into my exposition in so 
far as their development was interpenetrated with the 
growth of "experimental psychology;" but I do not, of 
course, pretend to have written an adequate history of 
either movement. (p. x) 
Boring clearly stated his intention to trace 
the history of experimental psychology as he 
defined it Critiquing Boring for ignoring the 
applied elements of psychology, as O'Donnell 
(1979) does, or arguing as Vande Kemp that 
this view of history "especially influenced the 
older generation of contemporary psycholo-
gists" (p. 24) seems unfounded in light of 
Boring's opening statement of his intentions. 
Could it be instead that psychology evolved as 
an experimental science not because of a 
conspiracy to shape it that way, or because of 
the historical circumstances (i.e., the depres-
sion; O'Donnell, 1979) but because its 
scientific methodology proved tci be the most 
productive approach? It may be revisionists' 
interpretations of history tell us more about 
the writer and the age in which they write than 
about history. 
We agree with Vande Kemp's (1987) 
contention that the "most conservative of the 
anti-psychologists who reject all sources of 
knowledge other than authority" would find 
no form of psychology acceptable (p. 20). We 
disagree, however, that "there is little point in 
presenting an argument" (p. 20). ~he co~ser­
vative anti-psychologists have been mcreasmgly 
vocal in their opposition to psychology and 
may be having a disproportionate influence on 
people's attitudes toward psychology. We are 
particularly concerned with the growing 
number of anti-psychology books and the 
effect they may have on the public's view of 
psychology. . 
Paul Vitz (1977) published the anti-
psychology book Psychology as Religion: 
The Cult of Self Worship, selling nearly 
46,000 copies. Martin and Deidre Bobgan 
( 1979) published another critique, The 
Psychological Way/The Spiritual Way, and 
sold 17,000 copies. William Kirk Kilpatrick 
(1983) sold 47,000 copies of his Psycho-
logical Seduction and Hunt and McMahon 
(1985) have sold 410,000 copies of The 
Seduction ofChristianity. Kilpatrick's critique 
of psychology appeared not only in book form 
but also in published interviews (Thorn, 1986) 
and articles (Kilpatrick, 1986). These books 
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and articles mix legitimate concerns with 
extremist views and often attack psychology's 
fringe (i.e., fad therapies). In these attacks, 
psychology critics are impacting psychology 
by discouraging those who may need the help 
of a professional Christian psychologist 
Dr. Vande Kemp (1987) also suggests 
that psychology and religion are really 
addressing different questions; To a certain 
degree this is true. Nevertheless there are large 
areas of overlap between the two fields. We 
are inclined to agree with Gary Collins ( 1981) 
when he suggests that psychology and theology 
have" similar interests and overlapping goals" 
(p. 15). Psychologists and theologians both 
deal with "human behavior, values, inter-
personal relations, attitudes, beliefs, path-
ology, marriage, the family, helping, and 
problem areas such as loneliness, discour-
agement, grief and anxiety" (Collins, p. 15). 
This overlap in perceived responsibility leads 
to competition and may be another root of the 
conflict between Christian anti-psychologists 
and psychology. 
When Vande Kemp, Van Leeuwen and 
other critics look at the field of psychology 
they see an unproductive discipline appren-
ticed to a stilted methodology and in desperate 
need of change. When we look at the discipline, 
however, we see an exciting, productive field 
rich with theory, research, and application. 
We are not particularly concerned when 
scholars such as these criticize the field of 
psychology since these well thought-out 
critiques serve to force mainstream psychology 
into reexamination and self-evalutation, 
particularly when the discussions are carried 
out in journals such as this. We are much more 
concerned with Christian anti-psychologists, 
however, who are carrying out their attacks in 
the public forum, since these one-sided attacks 
are likely to be read by people who do not have 
ready access to alternative points of view. 
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